



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 4, 1972

NOTE Para 3

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MEMORANDUM

TO: H - Mr. Abshire
FROM: PM - Joseph J. Wolf
SUBJECT: Symington Subcommittee
Lowenstein's Views on Problem Areas

Jim Lowenstein called me last night on his return from Southeast Asia. He said they had a good trip, were tired, and that he hoped to meet with me early next week. I said I have some medical tests the first part of the week and agreed I would call him as soon as I got back.

He expressed general satisfaction with the friendly and forthcoming reception they had received on their trip, subject to the following exceptions, which he clearly identified as issues with Washington rather than with the field, and all of which related to Legislative/Executive relations.

1. He placed great emphasis on the denial of their request to see the SEATO Contingency Plans. In response to my comment that we had generally taken the position against providing access to military contingency plans, he pointed out that in the case of the Taksin Plan, Mr. Laid had ultimately given in on providing it, but only after considerable political cost. He pointed out that a refusal to give access to these contingency plans could become a major political issue. I asked whether he did not appreciate the principle that was involved here, and said I wondered whether the Committee as a whole would want to look at all military contingency plans, including our

*Contingency
for US forces
in Thailand*

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State Dept. review completed

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NATO ones. Lowenstein countered by saying that the issue that was connected with this was whether or not the SEATO Treaty should be reviewed and perhaps revised, and emphasized that a denial of access to the contingency plans might well lead to future problems such as moves in that direction. I pointed out that the Committee had not formally requested these contingency plans from a responsible Agency head and that therefore making them available in the field to staff personnel was out of the question.

2. He said he could not understand why access had been denied to the AID CFS for Cambodia. He pointed out that they had been provided with these field submissions for Laos and Thailand. I drew his attention to the principle that had been established with regard to Five-Year MAP plans, culminating in the President's decision on asserting Executive Privilege on that score, and said that the principle applicable to such internal planning documents also applied to AID staff recommendations from the field. Lowenstein said this would be an issue; and that it might have a real effect on the Committee's attitude toward AID's programs. I countered by saying that I did not think the Executive Branch meant to deny all relevant information, and could provide witnesses who could tell the Committee the essential information, nevertheless reserving the document from being produced. Lowenstein said he would talk about that, but that he thought the staff and the Committee would not be satisfied with a witness but would insist on seeing the document. He insisted we should re-define our guidelines. He wanted to be sure that if we were denying this document to the SFRC it would not be provided to any other Committee. I said that our policy was being applied without discrimination.

He then proceeded to argue that the Committee should be given access to the MAP plans. Adopting a completely different tack than that taken by Proxmire and Fulbright last year when they emphasized their need to have five-year projects, Lowenstein said that, for the purpose he was interested in, he would be willing to have the subsequent four years of the MAP plans blacked out, but that he wanted the basic justification connected with the current year planning. I suggested that the Congressional

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Presentation Documents provided the Hill went some distance in that direction, but Lowenstein was quick to respond that they do not give nearly the full story that is portrayed in the MAP plans. He felt the same was true for the AID Congressional Presentation Documents in relation to their field submissions. I said that if that was the case, we ought to talk about it and see what if anything could be worked out to provide greater information in depth, and we agreed to put this on our agenda for our next week's meeting.

3. Lowenstein said that he accepted Mr. Helms' position, that there was a problem of jurisdiction between the SFRC and the Oversight Committee, which really the Congress ought to resolve internally. But he rejected the argument that certain intelligence information should be provided in Washington rather than being looked into in the field.

Finally, he complained that there had been several instances, to his own knowledge, of slanted and erroneous reporting on meetings in which Lowenstein and Moose had participated; and he felt that it was only fair to ask that memoranda reporting on conversations in which they participated could be reviewed by them for accuracy of their own positions, leaving it open, if such should develop, to state disagreements. I said we could certainly think about this.

CC: H - Mr. Symmes, Mr. Schnee
 J - Mr. Baudry
 U - Mr. Veliotis
 EA - Mr. Green, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Sullivan,
 Mr. Whitehouse, Mr. Dexter, Mr. Corcoran
 U/SA - Mr. Newman
 PM - Mr. Spiers, Mr. Pickering, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Chapman
 White House - Mr. Lehman
 CIA - Mr. Maury ✓
 DOD - Mr. French
 AID - Mr. O'Connor, Mr. Silver

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